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Abstract 
The focus of this report is to explore the link between demographic and education 
indicators and emigration at a global level. The relationship between demographic 
pressure and migration has been previously explored and findings have shown that 
population bulges may lead to increased emigration. Nevertheless, this study approaches 
the research question by challenging previous findings and discussing the interactions 
between economic growth and demographic pressure. In particular, findings show that 
demographic transition may or may not affect emigration patterns depending not only on 
the level of economic development of the country but also the rate of economic growth 
and the various other aspects of human development.  
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1 Introduction 
This report investigates the relationship between demographic as well as education 
variables and emigration. It has been previously argued that demographic factors, such 
as population growth and dependency ratio, are linked to international migration when 
certain economic conditions are met. In particular, high fertility rates in developing 
countries lead to an increase of the share of young and working age population which 
then might lead to a rise in emigration rates of young people looking for jobs (De Haas 
2010, 2011, Hatton & Williamson 2003, 2005, Kim & Cohen 2010). However, education is 
also an important factor that only lately has been included in demographic projections 
and is often ignored when exploring migration drivers. As education is linked to many 
demographic indicators, in particular fertility rates, and is crucial in changing population 
composition and dynamics, it may be important in explaining emigration patterns. In 
addition, demographic and education variables (KC & Lutz 2014) are used in population 
projections and their future uncertainty is low compared to other explanatory variables 
for migration such as GDP, labour market indicators or the presence of conflicts and 
natural disasters. Therefore, the goal of this report is firstly to provide a description of 
demographic and education trends globally, and then to explore the associations between 
emigration rates and demographic as well as education factors while controlling for 
several other variables such as GDP per capita and urbanisation. This work mainly 
explores associations employing regression techniques and does not intend to prove 
causality.  
 
The association between demographic conditions and migration has been previously 
researched by including the share of young people or the dependency ratios as 
explanatory variables in gravity models. Most often the demographic indicators are used 
as controls in regressions where the variables of interest are economic, environmental or 
conflict indicators (Backhaus et al. 2015, Beine and Parsons 2015, Mayda 2010), while 
other studies focus more on the demographic pressure (Hatton & Williamson 2003, Kim & 
Cohen 2010). Beine and Parsons (2015) find a negative relationship between dependency 
ratio and migration. Hatton & Williamson (2003) investigate the effect of demographic 
and economic factors on African out-migration by including the share of 15-29 years old 
in the regression of African net out-migration and finding a positive effect. Kim & Cohen 
(2010) particularly explore the effect of demographic factors such as life expectancy, 
infant mortality and potential support ratio as proxies for economic and living conditions 
in a country. The authors argue that demographic indicators such as life expectancy at 
birth and infant mortality ratio often might be the only available measures of health or 
quality of life and that a country with higher mortality should be expected to have higher 
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emigration. On the other hand, the direct relationship between education and migration 
has been little explored with the exception of the study of Hatton and Williamson (2005). 
In addition, Grogger & Hanson (2011) look at migrant selectivity and income 
maximization by education, while Brabo & Mbaye (2015) examine the differences in 
migration determinants by education level in country of origin. 
 
This analysis uses available data on demographic and educational indicators from two 
sources: World Bank Development Indicators and Wittgenstein centre. The migration 
stock data are obtained through the United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Population Division. The descriptive as well as the regression analysis in this 
report are performed and presented using R and the following R packages: countrycode, 
dplyr, tidyr, ggplot2 and stargazer (all data and software sources are included in the list 
of references). 
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2 Demographic and education trends in a global context 
 
2.1 Demographic indicators 
 
In this section, changes in the demographic indicators across the globe since 1960 are 
explored and discussed. The indicators are obtained from the World Bank World 
Development Indicators website. The main demographic indicators of interest in this 
analysis are: crude death rate (CRD), total fertility rate (TFR), population growth rate, 
and dependency ratio (see below for the definitions of these indicators). Most developed 
countries have been experiencing a common pattern in their demographic changes, i.e. 
undergoing demographic transition, with a decrease in mortality, fertility and population 
growth and an increase in old dependency ratio since 1960s. However, trends in fertility 
are no longer as strongly differentiated by developing status (developed versus 
developing) as before (Lutz et al. 2014). Persistent declines in fertility rates have also 
appeared in less developed countries although a couple decades later. In 2010, only 
certain countries in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia still had fertility rates above four births 
per woman, while some other like China have lower TFR than Sweden or France. The TFR 
graph in Figure 1 shows that the TFR has been decreasing more rapidly in low middle to 
high income countries rather in low income countries1, for which the TFR in 2010 is still 
well above the TFR in 1960 for high income countries. In general, countries undergo 
demographic transition at different times and with different rates but the theory claims 
that the fertility decline should carry on to the replacement level and possibly below it 
worldwide in the future. 
Low mortality is observed mostly in high and upper middle income countries while high 
mortality is prevalent in most sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh). As presented in Figure 1, CDR tends to drop over time for all income 
groups. The rate of reduction is higher for low income countries and the opposite for high 
income countries. This is mostly because death rate starts from really low values already 
in the 1960s for developed countries and perhaps has reached its lowest values. 
 
 
 
                                          
1 Income groups are used as defined by World Bank in the World Development Indicators and are invariant in 
time. 
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Table 1. Definitions of demographic indicators. 
Crude death rate (CDR). The number of deaths occurring during the year, per 1000 
population estimated at midyear. 
 
Infant mortality rate (IMR). Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying 
before reaching one year of age, per 1000 live births in a given year. 
 
Total fertility rate (TFR). It represents the number of children that would be born to a 
woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in 
accordance with age-specific fertility rates of the specified year. 
 
Population growth (PG). The exponential rate of growth of midyear population from 
year t-1 to t, expressed as a percentage. Population is based on the de facto definition of 
population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship2. 
 
Dependency ratio (DR). The ratio of people younger than 15 and older than 64 to 
those ages 15-64 (working-age population). Data are shown as the proportion of 
dependents per 100 working-age population. 
 
Crude birth rate (CBR). Crude birth rate indicates the number of live births occurring 
during the year, per 1000 population estimated at midyear. 
 
The combination of low fertility and low mortality leads to population ageing worldwide, 
with steady increases in the old age dependency ratio and the opposite for the young age 
dependency ratio (Figure 1). In high income countries the steep increase in the 
percentage of people above 65 years old and decline in the percentage of children below 
the age of 15 means that the former is almost equal or surpasses the latter in the last 
decades. In addition, the percentage of children under 15 years old in upper middle 
income countries has been declining very fast following the decline in fertility rates below 
replacement level. This means that the percentage of future 15-64 years old individuals 
will also decline substantially since the influx of young people shrinks. The changes in the 
age distribution in lower income countries have been slower but are expected to intensify 
in the next decades according to the demographic transition theory. Future population 
                                          
2 Note that PG here is not natural growth but migration contributes to this rate. 
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projections show that population ageing will be prevalent in every country but its rate 
and extent will differ by groups of countries depending on cultural and socio-economic 
factors. 
The patterns in crude death and birth rate show evidence of the demographic transition 
theory (Willekens, 2014) for all income groups. The differences lie in the timing as well 
as the speed of the transition. High income countries have been transitioning from the 
late expanding phase to low stationary and even declining population phase with very low 
death and birth rates in the last couple decades. Although perhaps the rate of transition 
might be faster nowadays for upper middle and lower middle income countries, on 
average both groups are in the late expanding phase in 2015. The death rate has been 
declining rapidly in the low income countries to reach levels of around 10 deaths per 
1000 population while the birth rate is still high, which suggests that these countries are 
in the last phase of the early expanding phase, or perhaps the beginning of the late 
expanding phase. Infant mortality rate has also been decreasing which accounts for the 
increase in the world population according to the newest UN population projections.  
Population growth appears to be dropping for all income groups but the low income, for 
which there is a more or less constant growth rate. Similarly, the trend in young 
dependency ratio shows that young population is on decline for all income groups 
reflecting the trend in birth rates. Even if it is still high for the low income countries, it 
appears it has reached its peak and it is also on decline. The opposite is observed for the 
old dependency ratio which is increasing rapidly for the high income countries showing 
the rapid population ageing.  
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Figure 1. Trends in demographic indicators by income group. 
 
Source: Author's own calculations using the World Development Indicators, World Bank. Averages and their 
95% confidence intervals are shown in solid lines and similarly shaded bands. 
 
2.2 Education trends 
 
3.2 Education trends 
The impact of demographic factors should not be explored separately from education as 
it has been shown that education greatly affects mortality and fertility rates as well as 
desired family size (Lutz et al. 2014). In particular, better educated women have fewer 
children, and the children of better educated individuals have higher survival rates. 
However, the impact of education on demographic composition takes a long time before 
it can be observed: more girls at school now will have an effect on fertility in 15-20 
years. Moreover, a drop in fertility rate will not immediately cause lower absolute number 
of births because of the large age-structural momentum of population growth (more 
young women moving into reproductive ages as consequence of past high fertility). 
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Education influences not only every aspect of an individual's life but also the structure of 
societies.  Lutz et al. (2014) discuss in detail how alternative scenarios of future 
education expansion may affect population growth. Several measures of the education 
level at the country level exist, such as educational attainment by gender and age group, 
average years of schooling and gender gap in educational attainment and years of 
schooling. Data are obtained through the Wittgenstein Centre3 data explorer and certain 
indicators have been projected backward to account for missing values in some countries 
and years.  
Figure 2 presents trends in three education indicators: the share of population 20-39 
years old with secondary or higher education, the mean years of schooling for individuals 
20-39 years old, and the gender gap in mean years of schooling for people 25 years old 
and above. Nevertheless, as the trends for the first two indicators are very similar it is 
only the first one that is included in the regression analysis. The gender gap in mean 
years of schooling may be thought to be a proxy for gender equality and female 
empowerment in a specific country. Nevertheless, this theory is not valid for every 
country as there are exceptions where women of young cohorts have higher education 
than their male peers such as Saudi Arabia. 
A general upwards trend is observed in educational attainment and mean years of 
schooling for males and females. The rate of increase in education is faster for high 
income countries and much slower for low income countries. The trend in schooling 
gender gap shows a steady decline for high income countries, while it firstly increases 
and then decreases for the other income groups4. This pattern is more obvious for the 
low and lower middle groups, perhaps due to the fact that men have better access to 
education than women in developing countries. It is worth noting that the gender gap in 
schooling was less different among income groups in the 70s and 80s, while after then 
the differences are more prominent in particular for low and lower middle income group 
countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
3 The link for this and other data websites are provided in the list of references. 
4 Defined as the difference between mean years of schooling for male 25 years old or older and mean years of 
schooling for female 25 years old or older. 
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Figure 2. Trends in education indicators by income group. 
 
Source: Author's own calculations using data from Wittgenstein Centre data explorer. Averages and their 95% 
confidence intervals are shown in solid lines and similarly shaded bands. 
 
 
 
2.3 Emigration trends 
 
The following graphs show the average emigration trends together with their 95% 
confidence intervals by 5-year period and continent. The data is available through 
UNDESA website that provides estimates of the international migrant stock by age, sex 
and origin for the mid-point (1 July) of each year: 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 and 
2015. The migrant stocks are then aggregated over country of birth to obtain the total 
number of emigrants by country of birth. The highest emigration is observed for Asia in 
all time points and it appears to be steadily increasing. Emigration in Europe is the 
second highest and also shows an increase since 2000. Finally although emigration in the 
Americas and Africa were about the same in 1990, emigration in the Americas has been 
rising faster than emigration in Africa.  Table 1 presents how the emigrant stock evolves 
over time for the top three emigrating countries by continent and by income5. The 
highest stock of emigrants for each continent is observed for Egypt in 2015, Mexico in 
2015, India in 2015 and Russia in 1990. The top three emigrating countries are: Great 
Britain, Germany and Italy (high income), Russia, Mexico and China (upper middle 
income), India, Bangladesh and Ukraine (lower middle income), Afghanistan, Burkina 
Faso and Somalia (low income).  
                                          
5 Emigration for countries in Oceania is not shown in this table as it is considerably lower than emigration in the 
other continents. 
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Figure 3. Emigration by continent 
 
Source: Author's own calculations using data from UNDESA. Averages and their 95% confidence intervals are 
shown in solid lines and similarly shaded bands. 
 
 
Table 2. Emigrant stocks (1000s) for top three emigrating countries by continent. 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Africa       
Morocco 1587 1735 1947 2383 2779 2834 
Egypt 1320 1488 1704 1898 2607 3268 
Algeria 905 963 1024 1590 1633 1763 
Asia       
India 6717 7209 7952 9617 13285 15574 
China 4227 4901 5753 7192 8597 9545 
Bangladesh 5449 5417 5432 5761 6748 7205 
Americas       
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Mexico 4393 6722 9329 10515 11828 12339 
USA 1735 1836 1988 2303 2721 3023 
Colombia 1007 1199 1421 1865 2492 2638 
Europe       
Russia 12696 11657 10812 10537 10430 10576 
Ukraine 5549 5613 5607 5592 5497 5825 
Great Britain 2684 2602 3849 4121 4555 4917 
Source: Author's own calculations using data from UNDESA. 
 
Evidence supports that emigration is highest in countries in upper middle income group, 
following by lower middle group (Figure 4) and thatemigration in high income countries is 
higher than in low income countries. Two theories regarding the relationship between 
economic indicators and migration exist in the literature and evidence appears to support 
both. The first claims that economic growth and development in sending countries will 
reduce international migration and it assumes an inversely proportional linear 
relationship between income differentials and migration. The second theory claims that 
economic and human development lead to higher levels of migration and that the 
relationship between them has an inverted U shape (De Haas, 2010). Hence, evidence 
from the literature finds both a negative relationship between GDP per capita at source 
country and emigration (Backhaus et al. 2015, Drabo & Mbaye 2015, Hatton & 
Williamson 2003), and a positive relationship (Docquier et al. 2014, De Haas 2010).  
The findings in this report are in line with the theory that there is an inverted U 
relationship between a country's economic conditions and emigration (Hatton & 
Williamson 2003, Clemens 2014). Although low income can incentivise people to migrate, 
it also imposes certain financial constraints to those who might want to migrate. 
Therefore an increase in income (upper and lower middle income countries) will reduce 
the poverty trap and allow some potential emigrants to leave, but once they become 
richer a further increase in income might affect emigration negatively (high income 
countries).  
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Figure 4. Emigration by income group. 
 
Source: Author's own calculations using data from UNDESA. Averages and their 95% confidence intervals are 
shown in solid lines and similarly shaded bands. 
 
 
 
2.4 Additional variables 
 
In addition to the main explanatory variables (demographic and education indicators), 
several other variables describing conditions and emigration pressure at country of origin 
are included in the regression analysis as controls6. Some of these were previously found 
to be associated with migration such as urbanisation (percentage of the population living 
in urban areas and urban population growth) and GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$). 
Urbanisation is rather high in high income countries with more than 70% of the 
population living in cities versus an average of 35% in low income countries for 2015. It 
has also been increasing globally, however the rate of urbanisation has been declining 
and more or less levelling out in the last three decades7. Regarding the GDP per capita, a 
large gap between the average GDP per capita (35552$ in 2015) is present in the high 
income group and in the immediate after upper middle income group (6894$ in 2015). It 
                                          
6 All predictors are averaged over the 5-year interval (t, t+4). 
7 Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices. It is calculated 
using World Bank population estimates and urban ratios from the United Nations World Urbanization Prospects. 
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appears to have stopped rising for all income groups reflecting the stall in economic 
growth which has an important impact on emigration particularly for low income 
countries.  
Moreover, I use the percentage of population with cell phone subscriptions as a proxy for 
access to mass media and technology in the country, a factor that has been known to 
facilitate emigration (Piotrowski 2013, Winkler 2017). The share of population with cell 
phone has increased dramatically since the 90s showing the rapid technological advances 
that occurred in the last two decades. Finally, I control for immigration rate defined as 
number of immigrants per 1000 persons as it appears that a country in a certain 
demographic transition phase may switch from being an emigration country to being an 
immigration country (Zelinsky 1971). High income countries have the highest 
immigration rate that has been steadily increasing and is more than three times higher 
than the immigration rate in upper middle income countries.  Although immigration rate 
has been increasing for high and upper middle income groups, the opposite is observed 
for lower middle and low income groups. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for control variables. 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
High income       
Pop. with 
cellphone 
subscriptions 
2   (0.29) 15 (1.38) 61 (2.91) 105 (2.87) 128 (4.47) 133 (5.21) 
GDP per capita 16095 
(1299.4) 
18271 
(1482.3) 
21203 
(1587.8) 
33215 
(2490.6) 
38404 
(2970.2) 
35552 
(2736.8) 
Immigration rate 157 
(22.25) 
166 
(22.93) 
171 
(22.34) 
183 (23) 
197 
(24.68) 
207 
(25.44) 
Urban population 74 (2.25) 75 (2.26) 76 (2.28) 76 (2.32) 77 (2.36) 78 (2.39) 
Urban population 
growth 
1.4  (0.2) 1.2 (0.17) 1.2  (0.2) 1.6 (0.37) 1.1 (0.24) 1   (0.17) 
Upper middle 
income 
      
Pop. with 
cellphone 
subscriptions 
0   (0.03) 2   (0.34) 20 (1.93) 69 (3.87) 111 (4.47) 118 (5.02) 
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GDP per capita 2330 
(258.3) 
2593 
(219.8) 
2909 
(200.9) 
5444 
(342.8) 
7622 
(435.3) 
6894 
(346.1) 
Immigration rate 47 (9.09) 48 (9.09) 51 (9.83) 52 (10.27) 58 (10.37) 63 (11.55) 
Urban population 54   (2.3) 56 (2.32) 57 (2.33) 59 (2.34) 61 (2.35) 62 (2.35) 
Urban population 
growth 
2.4 (0.27) 1.9 (0.24) 1.8 (0.24) 1.7 (0.25) 1.8 (0.23) 1.7 (0.19) 
Lower middle 
income 
      
Pop. with 
cellphone 
subscriptions 
0        (0) 0   (0.08) 6   (0.73) 37 (2.95) 82   (4.1) 94 (4.07) 
GDP per capita 
755 (59.8) 873 (78.3) 922 (83.4) 
1544 
(118.9) 
2284 
(146.2) 
2323 
(144.1) 
Immigration rate 39      (7) 32 (6.26) 29 (5.8) 25 (4.75) 23 (4.17) 21 (3.87) 
Urban population 36 (2.32) 38 (2.34) 39 (2.37) 41 (2.41) 43 (2.46) 44   (2.5) 
Urban population 
growth 
3.2 (0.27) 2.7 (0.27) 2.7 (0.24) 2.6 (0.22) 2.5  (0.2) 2.5 (0.18) 
Low income       
Pop. with 
cellphone 
subscriptions 
0        (0) 0   (0.02) 2   (0.29) 15 (1.86) 48 (4.26) 66 (5.46) 
GDP per capita 309   (32) 294 (29.6) 296 (21.9) 451 (32.9) 608 (36.4) 602 (35.6) 
Immigration rate 31 (5.67) 29 (5.58) 23 (4.98) 21 (4.15) 18   (3.7) 17 (3.28) 
Urban population 25 (2.32) 27 (2.19) 29 (2.22) 31 (2.29) 33 (2.37) 35 (2.48) 
Urban population 
growth 
4.2 (0.38) 4.2 (0.42) 4.2 (0.27) 4.1 (0.26) 4   (0.24) 4   (0.22) 
Source: Author's own calculations using data from WDI, Wold Bank and UNDESA. Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
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3 Results 
 
To model the emigration rate, I employ a quasi-Poisson or pseudo-likelihood Poisson 
model that accounts for over-dispersion by estimating the dispersion parameter (Silva 
and Tenreyro, 2006). This specification does not assume that the variance is equal to the 
mean as the classic Poisson model does. The Poisson distribution is suitable for count 
data such as the emigrant stock used in this analysis. In this setting the outcome Y 
(emigrant stock) has a Poisson distribution and the logarithm of its expected value is 
linearly linked to the explanatory variables: 
log(𝐸(𝒚|𝒙)) = 𝒃′𝑿 
 
which means that the predicted mean of this model is 
 
𝐸(𝒚|𝒙) = 𝑒𝒃
′𝑿 
 
This is the main difference with the typical log-normal gravity equation used by 
economists to model the migrant stock or flows, in particular that it estimates 𝐸(log⁡(𝑌)|𝑥) 
instead of 𝐸(𝑌|𝑥) and therefore no bias from the logarithmic transformation is introduced 
in the model (see Burger et al. 2009 for further elaboration). The quasi-Poisson 
regression produces the same coefficient estimates as the standard Poisson model but 
inference is adjusted for over-dispersion. 
In order to identify the most relevant factors capturing demographic pressure I have 
used the following indicators: share of 15-29 years old in the population (model 1), 5-
year lagged population growth (model 2) and 20-year lagged birth rate (model 3)8. The 
regressions are run for the pooled data set and by country income group (tables in the 
appendix).  
Table 4 presents the estimated regression coefficients, CI and p-values for the pooled 
data regressions. In general it is evident that the coefficients of the common variables 
across models have the same sign although the magnitude of the effect or its significance 
may be slightly different. Population size is positively associated with emigration and 
countries with high infant mortality rate are more likely to have more people emigrating, 
                                          
8 Note that caution has been exercised in order to avoid including variables with high correlation in the same 
regression, therefore not all discussed demographic variables are selected as covariates in the regressions. 
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which is the expected effect direction according to Kim & Cohen (2010). Urbanisation as 
well as the rate of urbanisation is positively associated with emigration. The results for 
GDP per capita show that better economic conditions are associated with higher 
emigration in the source country; however this effect is lessened as the GDP increases as 
we see from the squared term of GDP per capita. The majority of previous findings 
suggest a negative relation between GDP and migration, mostly in line with the theory 
that economic growth reduces out-migration.  
In all three regressions higher share of well-educated 20-39 years old individuals 
(secondary or higher education) is associated with higher emigration showing that better 
capabilities and aspirations increase emigration. The coefficient of gender gap in 
schooling as proxy for gender equality implies that countries with higher gender 
inequality in education tend to have higher emigration but a gender analysis to identify 
whether men or women emigrated more is not performed in this report. In addition, the 
coefficient of population share with cell phone subscriptions does not agree  with previous 
hypotheses in the literature that discuss how access to mass media and technology may 
facilitate emigration (Piotrowski 2013). Finally, countries with high immigration tend to 
have lower emigration than those with low immigration.  
As far as the variables describing demographic pressure, model 1 shows that the 
coefficient of share of youth in the population is not statistically significant, however, 
both population growth and birth rate are negatively associated with emigration (model 2 
and 3). These results suggest that demographic pressure is linked to less emigration but 
they need to be interpreted with caution. Although it may be true that population growth 
does not lead to higher emigration, it is also not wise to assume that it leads to lower 
emigration. When high population growth occurs in countries with very low income and 
stalled economic growth, then the emigration will be indeed lower and this is perhaps 
what drives these coefficients. To further disentangle these effects, regressions by 
income group are run and presented in the appendix. 
 
Table 4. Quasi-Poisson regression of emigration (pooled model). 
 
Emigrant stock 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Log(population) 0.693*** 0.930*** 0.772*** 
 
(0.486, 0.900) (0.736, 1.124) (0.565, 0.980) 
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IMR 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.014*** 
 
(0.010, 0.015) (0.008, 0.013) (0.011, 0.017) 
Share of 15-29 y.o. -0.300 
  
 
(-1.280, 0.680) 
  
Lagged pop. growth 
 
-0.144*** 
 
  
(-0.169, -0.118) 
 
Lagged birth rate 
  
-0.011*** 
   
(-0.017, -0.004) 
Urban population 0.673** 0.222 0.532** 
 
(0.130, 1.215) (-0.276, 0.719) (0.005, 1.058) 
Urban population growth 0.024* 0.017 0.023* 
 
(0.000, 0.048) (-0.004, 0.039) (-0.0002, 0.047) 
Log(GDP per capita) 0.510*** 0.270** 0.499*** 
 
(0.266, 0.754) (0.042, 0.498) (0.259, 0.740) 
Log(GDP per capita sq.) -0.020** -0.004 -0.019** 
 
(-0.036, -0.004) (-0.019, 0.010) (-0.035, -0.004) 
Share of 20-39 with 
secondary+ 
1.452*** 1.266*** 1.263*** 
 
(1.003, 1.901) (0.858, 1.675) (0.796, 1.729) 
Gender gap in schooling 0.081** 0.075** 0.059 
 
(0.003, 0.159) (0.001, 0.149) (-0.024, 0.142) 
Share with cellphone subs. -0.107** -0.074* -0.149*** 
 
(-0.194, -0.021) (-0.153, 0.005) (-0.235, -0.063) 
Immigration rate -2.329*** -1.350*** -2.488*** 
 
(-3.342, -1.316) (-2.310, -0.390) (-3.518, -1.457) 
Year: 1995 0.049* -0.006 0.047* 
 
(-0.004, 0.101) (-0.055, 0.043) (-0.004, 0.098) 
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Year: 2000 0.129*** 0.028 0.129*** 
 
(0.061, 0.196) (-0.036, 0.093) (0.064, 0.195) 
Year: 2005 0.168*** 0.018 0.183*** 
 
(0.067, 0.268) (-0.078, 0.114) (0.085, 0.281) 
Year: 2010 0.256*** 0.084 0.273*** 
 
(0.121, 0.391) (-0.043, 0.211) (0.142, 0.404) 
Year: 2015 0.302*** 0.133* 0.308*** 
 
(0.149, 0.456) (-0.009, 0.275) (0.160, 0.456) 
Observations 966 965 961 
Country fixed effects included in the regression but not shown here. Significance thresholds are: <0.01 ***, 
<0.05 **, <0.1 *. 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses. 
 
The results by income group show how the associations differ depending on the level of 
economic development of the country (tables A1-4). Moreover, certain coefficients 
change sign which means there is an interaction between the particular covariate and 
income group. For high income countries, population size appears to be positively and 
statistically significantly associated with emigration. A positive relationship is also found 
between IMR, share of young people, lagged birth rate, GDP per capita and emigration. A 
large share of highly educated individuals is linked to lower emigration for high income 
countries as opposed to the rest of income groups. The relationship between urbanisation 
and emigration is negative and statistically significant suggesting that perhaps some 
countries in this group have transitioned to the phase with very low international 
emigration but high immigration of low skilled workers and more urban-to-urban 
mobility.  
Results for upper middle income countries show few statistically significant associations 
apart from the demographic pressure variables which all show that demographic pressure 
is associated with lower emigration. On the other hand, a high share of well-educated 
individuals in the population is linked to greater emigration. This is in agreement with De 
Haas (2010), who poses that youth or general population bulge does not necessarily 
mean an increase in out-migration unless these people have the means, as well as the 
potential to migrate which is often strengthened by education. None of the demographic 
pressure variables are statistically significant for the lower middle income group 
countries, while urbanisation is negatively associated with emigration. One can 
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hypothesize that this also links migration to demographic transition, as high urban-to-
urban migration and low international migration is typically observed during early 
transition stages in societies (De Haas 2010).  
The regression analysis for low income countries further reveals that the share of young 
people in the population is strongly related to lower emigration, as well as the lagged 
population growth but not the 20-year lagged birth rate. This result again confirms the 
hypothesis that population growth itself does not make people move but it has to be 
accompanied by economic growth and human development. Finally, it is evident that 
although the income group of the country is linked to its demographic transition, there 
are countries in grey areas with high income but also high fertility (such as Oman) and 
the opposite (such as Sri Lanka), which also have non-conforming emigration patterns. 
 
 
4 Conclusions 
Although demographic transition has been linked to migration transition in previous 
studies (Zelinsky 1971), it has since been argued that this theory is not adequate to 
explain migration patterns (De Haas 2010). According to migration transition theory, 
societies in the high stationary phase exhibit only circular migration, all types of 
migration increase for societies in the early expanding phase while the opposite starts to 
happen for societies in the late expanding phase. Finally, migration becomes very specific 
(urban-to-urban, immigration of unskilled and semi-skilled workers) in the low stationary 
and declining population phase. The theory is appealing as it appears to hold for many 
countries, but other factors need to be considered in order to account for global 
migration patterns. More specifically, economic conditions and in general the level of 
human development is as important as ever in order to explain migration.  
This analysis suggests not only that most of the emigration drivers have a non-linear 
relationship with emigration but also that there is a strong interaction with the stage of 
economic development and demographic transition of the country. In addition, economic 
growth is strongly connected to the demographic transition and often results have to be 
interpreted by taking into account both (interaction)9. In other words, the effects of 
migration drivers are not monotonic or even one way. Evidence suggests that migration 
is complex phenomenon which cannot be explained by simple pooled regression analysis, 
but rather more sophisticated methods need to be employed to reveal and interpret 
particularly nuanced relationships. Moreover, certain countries exhibit characteristics that 
                                          
9 Work in progress focuses on exploring the interaction between demographic transition and economic growth 
and its effect on migration to EU patterns as well as investigating particular groups of countries with 
specific characteristics. 
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place them in contradictory phases of economic growth and demographic transitions and 
have to be examined separately as case studies or in groups by specific characteristics. 
In addition, as Willekens (2014) discuss demographic transition is not independent of 
other processes such as science and technology advances, epidemics, natural disasters 
and social or political changes and factors such these need to be controlled for. 
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Annexes 
Annex 1. Regressions by income group of the country 
 
Table A 1. QP regression for high income countries. 
 
Emigrant stock 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Log(population) 0.665*** 0.857*** 0.891*** 
 
(0.324, 1.005) (0.517, 1.196) (0.563, 1.218) 
IMR 0.033*** 0.025** 0.027** 
 
(0.009, 0.057) (0.001, 0.049) (0.003, 0.051) 
Share of 15-29 y.o. 1.980*** 
  
 
(0.745, 3.215) 
  
Lagged pop. growth 
 
-0.008 
 
  
(-0.051, 0.036) 
 
Lagged birth rate 
  
0.016*** 
   
(0.005, 0.027) 
Urban population -1.341*** -1.368*** -1.235** 
 
(-2.313, -0.369) (-2.364, -0.372) (-2.216, -0.254) 
Urban population growth 0.002 0.017 0.012 
 
(-0.029, 0.034) (-0.014, 0.048) (-0.019, 0.042) 
Log(GDP per capita) 1.319*** 1.552*** 1.606*** 
 
(0.341, 2.298) (0.561, 2.543) (0.630, 2.581) 
Log(GDP per capita sq.) -0.055** -0.067** -0.068** 
 
(-0.108, -0.003) (-0.119, -0.014) (-0.120, -0.015) 
Share of 20-39 with 
secondary+ 
-0.766*** -1.120*** -0.820*** 
 
(-1.271, -0.260) (-1.587, -0.653) (-1.321, -0.320) 
Gender gap schooling 0.131* 0.200*** 0.117* 
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(0.000, 0.262) (0.072, 0.328) (-0.019, 0.254) 
Share with cellphone 
subs. 
0.054 0.021 0.069 
 
(-0.081, 0.189) (-0.116, 0.158) (-0.069, 0.207) 
Immigration rate -2.680*** -2.705*** -3.043*** 
 
(-3.871, -1.488) (-3.939, -1.470) (-4.259, -1.827) 
Year: 1995 0.113*** 0.088** 0.086** 
 
(0.040, 0.186) (0.015, 0.161) (0.015, 0.158) 
Year: 2000 0.265*** 0.239*** 0.205*** 
 
(0.142, 0.387) (0.112, 0.365) (0.080, 0.330) 
Year: 2005 0.327*** 0.303*** 0.237** 
 
(0.136, 0.519) (0.104, 0.501) (0.038, 0.435) 
Year: 2010 0.528*** 0.505*** 0.424*** 
 
(0.304, 0.752) (0.274, 0.737) (0.191, 0.657) 
Year: 2015 0.701*** 0.663*** 0.591*** 
 
(0.471, 0.931) (0.424, 0.902) (0.354, 0.828) 
Observations 273 273 273 
Country fixed effects included in the regression but not shown here. Significance thresholds are: <0.01 ***, 
<0.05 **, <0.1 *. 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses. 
 
Table A 2. QP regression for upper middle income countries. 
 
Emigrant stock 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Log(population) 0.350* 0.308 0.051 
 
(-0.029, 0.730) (-0.108, 0.724) (-0.345, 0.447) 
IMR 0.004 0.004 0.007* 
 
(-0.003, 0.011) (-0.003, 0.012) (-0.001, 0.014) 
Share of 15-29 y.o. -4.123*** 
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(-5.704, -2.543) 
  
Lagged pop. growth 
 
-0.052* 
 
  
(-0.107, 0.004) 
 
Lagged birth rate 
  
-0.019*** 
   
(-0.030, -0.008) 
Urban population -0.202 0.080 0.228 
 
(-1.167, 0.763) (-0.938, 1.098) (-0.748, 1.204) 
Urban population growth -0.023 -0.006 -0.021 
 
(-0.075, 0.029) (-0.061, 0.048) (-0.076, 0.034) 
Log(GDP per capita) 0.220 0.417 0.489 
 
(-0.370, 0.810) (-0.198, 1.032) (-0.121, 1.100) 
Log(GDP per capita sq.) -0.003 -0.015 -0.020 
 
(-0.042, 0.035) (-0.055, 0.024) (-0.059, 0.019) 
Share of 20-39 with 
secondary+ 
3.329*** 3.198*** 2.925*** 
 
(2.419, 4.240) (2.231, 4.166) (1.952, 3.899) 
Gender gap schooling 0.409*** 0.455*** 0.428*** 
 
(0.215, 0.603) (0.252, 0.658) (0.217, 0.639) 
Share with cellphone 
subs. 
0.024 -0.092 -0.108 
 
(-0.148, 0.196) (-0.265, 0.080) (-0.279, 0.063) 
Immigration rate -0.512 0.859 0.520 
 
(-2.930, 1.905) (-1.772, 3.489) (-1.951, 2.991) 
Year: 1995 0.063 0.072 0.066 
 
(-0.027, 0.152) (-0.024, 0.169) (-0.028, 0.160) 
Year: 2000 0.142** 0.157** 0.158** 
 
(0.017, 0.267) (0.021, 0.293) (0.028, 0.288) 
Year: 2005 0.116 0.188* 0.205** 
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(-0.079, 0.312) (-0.020, 0.396) (0.008, 0.402) 
Year: 2010 0.063 0.223 0.205 
 
(-0.202, 0.327) (-0.048, 0.494) (-0.058, 0.468) 
Year: 2015 -0.044 0.213 0.153 
 
(-0.355, 0.267) (-0.094, 0.520) (-0.151, 0.457) 
Observations 279 279 277 
Country fixed effects included in the regression but not shown here. Significance thresholds are: <0.01 ***, 
<0.05 **, <0.1 *. 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses. 
 
 
Table A 3. QP regression for lower middle income countries. 
 
Emigrant stock 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Log(population) 0.710*** 0.701*** 0.796*** 
 
(0.442, 0.978) (0.431, 0.970) (0.520, 1.071) 
IMR 0.0004 0.001 0.001 
 
(-0.003, 0.004) (-0.003, 0.004) (-0.002, 0.005) 
Share of 15-29 y.o. -0.337 
  
 
(-1.857, 1.183) 
  
Lagged pop. growth 
 
-0.034 
 
  
(-0.092, 0.023) 
 
Lagged birth rate 
  
0.007 
   
(-0.002, 0.016) 
Urban population -0.962** -0.869** -0.603 
 
(-1.742, -0.182) (-1.640, -0.098) (-1.392, 0.185) 
Urban population growth -0.076*** -0.072*** -0.067*** 
 
(-0.114, -0.039) (-0.111, -0.033) (-0.105, -0.029) 
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Log(GDP per capita) 0.549** 0.544** 0.462* 
 
(0.067, 1.030) (0.066, 1.023) (-0.011, 0.934) 
Log(GDP per capita sq.) -0.028 -0.028 -0.024 
 
(-0.064, 0.008) (-0.064, 0.008) (-0.059, 0.012) 
Share of 20-39 with 
secondary+ 
0.878** 0.950** 1.213*** 
 
(0.151, 1.606) (0.230, 1.670) (0.485, 1.941) 
Gender gap schooling 0.124*** 0.138*** 0.060 
 
(0.040, 0.208) (0.045, 0.231) (-0.036, 0.157) 
Share with cellphone 
subs. 
0.036 0.039 0.008 
 
(-0.096, 0.167) (-0.092, 0.171) (-0.124, 0.139) 
Immigration rate 1.248 1.163 0.811 
 
(-0.249, 2.744) (-0.412, 2.738) (-0.782, 2.404) 
Year: 1995 -0.052 -0.062* -0.049 
 
(-0.117, 0.013) (-0.129, 0.005) (-0.113, 0.014) 
Year: 2000 -0.045 -0.065 -0.051 
 
(-0.132, 0.042) (-0.159, 0.028) (-0.136, 0.035) 
Year: 2005 -0.053 -0.084 -0.037 
 
(-0.194, 0.088) (-0.235, 0.066) (-0.178, 0.103) 
Year: 2010 0.032 -0.005 0.074 
 
(-0.178, 0.242) (-0.224, 0.215) (-0.136, 0.284) 
Year: 2015 0.098 0.064 0.141 
 
(-0.144, 0.340) (-0.185, 0.313) (-0.102, 0.384) 
Observations 257 256 254 
Country fixed effects included in the regression but not shown here. Significance thresholds are: <0.01 ***, 
<0.05 **, <0.1 *. 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses. 
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Table A 4. QP regression for low income countries. 
 
Emigrant stock 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Log(population) -2.540*** -0.345 -2.313*** 
 
(-3.990, -1.089) (-1.882, 1.192) (-3.839, -0.786) 
IMR 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 
 
(0.015, 0.027) (0.010, 0.024) (0.013, 0.026) 
Share of 15-29 y.o. -11.283*** 
  
 
(-17.225, -5.341) 
  
Lagged pop. growth 
 
-0.128*** 
 
  
(-0.190, -0.065) 
 
Lagged birth rate 
  
0.046** 
   
(0.010, 0.082) 
Urban population -0.293 0.089 -0.604 
 
(-2.149, 1.563) (-1.800, 1.977) (-2.564, 1.355) 
Urban population growth 0.115*** 0.059** 0.090*** 
 
(0.072, 0.158) (0.012, 0.107) (0.045, 0.135) 
Log(GDP per capita) 0.802 0.300 -0.221 
 
(-1.752, 3.357) (-2.246, 2.846) (-2.846, 2.403) 
Log(GDP per capita sq.) -0.071 -0.027 0.018 
 
(-0.292, 0.150) (-0.248, 0.193) (-0.208, 0.245) 
Share of 20-39 with 
secondary+ 
0.706 1.620 1.539 
 
(-1.507, 2.918) (-0.648, 3.889) (-0.782, 3.859) 
Gender gap schooling -0.151* -0.266*** -0.276*** 
 
(-0.317, 0.015) (-0.437, -0.094) (-0.455, -0.097) 
Share with cellphone 
subs. 
-0.104 0.188 0.120 
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(-0.545, 0.336) (-0.256, 0.632) (-0.334, 0.574) 
Immigration rate -4.507* -3.265 -5.551** 
(-9.659, 0.646) (-8.686, 2.157) (-10.863, -0.239) 
Year: 1995 0.679*** 0.252 0.553*** 
(0.390, 0.968) (-0.048, 0.553) (0.263, 0.843) 
Year: 2000 1.328*** 0.516* 1.076*** 
(0.775, 1.881) (-0.043, 1.076) (0.526, 1.626) 
Year: 2005 2.167*** 0.878** 1.817*** 
(1.345, 2.990) (0.039, 1.717) (0.997, 2.637) 
Year: 2010 2.876*** 1.115* 2.438*** 
(1.777, 3.974) (-0.014, 2.244) (1.337, 3.540) 
Year: 2015 3.411*** 1.260* 2.855*** 
(2.103, 4.718) (-0.081, 2.600) (1.551, 4.159) 
Observations 157 157 157 
Country fixed effects included in the regression but not shown here. Significance thresholds are: <0.01 ***, 
<0.05 **, <0.1 *. 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses. 
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